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THE INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITY RELATED PROBLEM BEHAVIOUR IN 
MAINSTREAM AUSTRALIAN SCHOOLS 
 
Introduction 
The enrolment of students with disabilities in mainstream schools, rather than ‘special’ schools, 
has been aspired to in Australia for at least two decades. The 2002 report of a Senate enquiry 
into the education of students with disabilities concluded that ‘inclusive practices’ had become 
the ‘prevailing orthodoxy’ in Australian schools (Australian Senate, 2002, p. 29). More 
recently, the National Disability Strategy 2010-2020 (Council of Australian Governments, 
2011, p. 49) committed Australia to the goal of inclusion of students with disability in a ‘high 
quality education system that is responsive to their needs’.  Underpinning any ‘right’ to 
‘inclusion’1 is the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (‘DDA’) which has the object of 
ensuring ‘as far as practicable, that persons with disabilities have the same rights to equality 
before the law as the rest of the community’ (s. 3). The DDA is informed and enlivened by 
Australia’s ratification of an array international rights instruments (s. 12(8)).  It was amended 
in 2009 to acknowledge the newly ratified Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities 
which explicitly stipulates in Article 24 that states parties shall ‘ensure’ that ‘[p]ersons with 
disabilities are not excluded from the general education system on the basis of disability’.  
 
Australia’s achievement of the goal of inclusion has proved difficult, however, in respect of 
people with disability related problem behaviour.  Most disability discrimination in education 
cases which end up in court involve problem behaviour flowing from intellectual, psychiatric 
or behavioural disability. Such behaviour may be disruptive, stressful or even dangerous.  It 
might be the impulsiveness of a person with Down’s syndrome (See, e.g., P2) or Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) (see, e.g., Walker, Abela), the problems with bowel 
control and regurgitation of a person with a developmental disorder (See, e.g., L), or most 
problematically, the unwilled violence of a person with brain damage (See, e.g., Purvis).  In 
Australian anti-discrimination legislation, the protected attribute of disability (or, for some 
Acts, impairment) typically extends to disturbed or disturbing behaviour.  For example, the 
DDA definition of disability covers ‘a disorder, illness or disease that affects a person's thought 
processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgment or that results in disturbed behaviour’ 
(DDA s 4).  Moreover, since 2009, the DDA definition has made it plain in s. 4 what the Courts 
had acknowledged (See, e.g., Purvis) that a disability ‘includes behaviour that is a symptom or 
manifestation of the disability’. 
It is indicative, perhaps, of the controversy that has historically attended the inclusion of 
students with problem behaviour, that the first disability discrimination in education case to be 
litigated in Australia, brought under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), L, involved a 
student excluded from her mainstream school because of her disability related behaviour.  The 
complainant failed to prove unlawful discrimination, but the case excited extensive media 
coverage and polarised public opinion on the issue of inclusion (see, e.g., Atkins, 1995; Butler, 
1995; Oberhardt, 1995; Atkins, 1996; Butler, 1996).  Two similar Queensland ‘behaviour’ 
cases, P and K, heard shortly after L, were also decided against the complainants.  Recent 
disability discrimination in education cases, including Walker and Abela, have also concerned 
students excluded for problem behaviour. The issue still troubles school communities: teachers 
and administrators, parents of students with and without disability, and students.   
A student who is refused enrolment at a mainstream school, or excluded from a mainstream 
school, may claim direct discrimination, ‘less favourable treatment’ (See, e.g., DDA s. 5).  A 
student may also claim indirect discrimination if an unreasonable condition is imposed, with 
which he or she cannot comply and which has the effect of disadvantaging him or her (See, 
e.g., DDA s 6).   Claims of indirect discrimination have been extrapolated, for example, from 
the blanket imposition of school codes of conduct. Proof of either direct or indirect 
discrimination has been difficult for students with disabilities manifesting as problem 
behaviour.  
This chapter will consider the  strategies for exclusion which the relevant case law reveals may 
be relied upon by schools when problem behaviour poses a health and safety risk or disrupts 
the learning of others.  It will consider how the courts have narrowed the scope of any 
obligation to include students with disability related problem behaviour, through the manner in 
which they have interpreted and applied various aspects of anti-discrimination law: direct and 
indirect discrimination, the unjustifiable hardship exemption to unlawful discrimination, and 
the obligation upon education providers to make reasonable adjustment for students with 
disability. 
The benchmark case in this area, and a primary focus of the chapter, is Purvis. In that case, the 
High Court of Australia controversially determined that a school could lawfully exclude a 
student with disability related problem behaviour, and to achieve that result, construed the test 
for direct discrimination in a manner which has subsequently undermined the utility of an 
action for direct discrimination across the areas and attributes protected in Australian anti-
discrimination law (Thornton, 2009).  School ‘code of conduct’ indirect discrimination cases 
have also been defeated on the basis that the imposition of such a code is ‘reasonable’ (See, 
e.g., M & C, Minns).  Further, in the event that a complainant should succeed in proving a 
prima facie case of direct or indirect discrimination, the unjustifiable hardship exemption will 
likely render such discrimination lawful (See, e.g., L, K, P). 
The implementation of the Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) (DSE), a year after 
the decision in Purvis, was an opportunity for both schools and courts to revisit the issue of the 
accommodation of problem behaviour.  The DSE impose on educationproviders, including 
schools, the obligation to make reasonable adjustment for students with disabilities.  
Reasonable adjustment, however, is also excused where a school can prove that it would cause 
unjustifiable hardship. Cases decided since the introduction of the DSE have not delivered any 
greater prospects of inclusion for students with problem behaviour (See, e.g., Walker and 
Abela).  
Both Commonwealth and state laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability (or 
impairment) in the protected area of education.  There is significant overlap between 
Commonwealth and State laws in respect of proof of discrimination and the exemptions which 
will render a prima facie case of discrimination lawful.  Since the DDA was amended in 2009 
to impose an institutional obligation to make reasonable adjustment for students with disability, 
the DDA, and the associated DSE, arguably offer superior protection to students with disability.  
Moreover, the effect of DDA s. 13(3A) is that the DSE, and its obligation to make reasonable 
adjustment, will override any inconsistent state law.  As such, the law as stated in and applied 
under the DDA and the DSE will be the primary focus of this chapter.  Discrimination 
complaints may still be brought under state legislation, however, and relevant case law from 
the state courts will also be addressed.  
 
Purvis v New South Wales: direct discrimination and problem behaviour 
The Purvis case, as the only directly relevant High Court case, is a logical place to begin an 
explanation of the complexities of the relevant law.  It represents the most complete 
examination of the inclusion issue by an Australian court to date.  The complainant in Purvis, 
Daniel Hoggan, was excluded from Year 7 at South Grafton High School, in New South Wales, 
because of what a witness neurologist described as his ‘difficult’ behaviour, ‘disinhibited and 
uninhibited’ behaviour (paras. [29], [182]).  Daniel’s behaviour was caused by and a 
consequence of brain damage sustained during infancy as a result of an infection with 
encephalitis. Over the course of his enrolment in Year 7, Daniel was suspended several times 
and ultimately excluded for repeated verbal abuse and violence which included kicking not 
only furniture and school bags but also other children and teaching staff. A majority of the 
High Court held that Daniel’s exclusion did not offend the DDA. 
Purvis and the ‘right’ to inclusion  
Four of the Justices on the Court, Chief Justice Gleeson CJ (para [6]), Justices McHugh and 
Kirby  (para. [123]) and Justice Callinan  (para. [238]), made some explicit comment on 
whether and to what extent there is a right to a ‘mainstream’ education available to students 
with disabilities. There is a measure of overlap in the analyses of these four judges, despite the 
fact that Justices McHugh and Kirby  ultimately found, in a minority judgment, that Daniel 
Hoggan had been the subject of unlawful discrimination. All four implied that the source of 
any right to inclusion could be traced to the international rights treaties behind the DDA. All 
four agreed that a mainstream education may not be available where the inclusion of a student 
impinged on the safety of other students and staff.  Three implied that a further limit may arise 
when educational opportunities of other students are adversely affected.   
 
Chief Justice Gleeson  made the clear point that the Purvis case concerned a clash between 
competing rights: ‘The present case illustrates that rights, recognised by international norms, 
or by domestic law, may conflict. In construing the Act, there is no warrant for an assumption 
that, in seeking to protect the rights of disabled pupils, Parliament intended to disregard 
Australia's obligations to protect the rights of other pupils’ (para. [6]). Chief Justice Gleeson  
implied that school students – and, indeed, staff – have a right to safety which school 
administrators have a duty to protect.  He questioned whether Parliament is constitutionally 
entitled to enact legislation which does not allow competing rights to be reconciled:  
 …a contention that the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament extends to 
 obliging State educational authorities to accept, or continue to accommodate, pupils 
 whose conduct is a serious threat to the safety of other pupils, or staff, or school 
 property, would require careful scrutiny (para. [6]).   
 
Justices McHugh and Kirby, like Chief Justice Gleeson, found that ‘the Act provides for a 
balance to be struck between the rights of the disabled child and those of other pupils and, for 
that matter, teaching staff’ (para. [123]). Like Chief Justice Gleeson, they found that a limit on 
the right to inclusion of students with disabilities would arise when the safety of others was put 
at risk: ‘The nature of the detriment likely to be suffered by any persons concerned, if the 
student was admitted, would comprehend consideration of threats to the safety and welfare of 
other pupils, teachers and aides’ (para. [123]).  Arguably, however, they implied a further limit 
by stating that ‘any negative impact that may be caused by the presence of a student with 
disability in a mainstream class is a proper matter to be considered when making a decision on 
whether that individual student can be admitted’ (para. [123]).    The vague phrase ‘any negative 
impact’ may be broad enough, for example, to encompass an adverse impact on the educational 
opportunities of others in a classroom. 
 
Justice Callinan was prepared to make explicit the limit implied by Justices McHugh and Kirby.  
Citing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, he found that any 
right to inclusion of students with a disability must be weighed against the ‘the right of 
everyone to education’ (para. [238]).  That universal right, he found, ‘could be adversely 
affected by an insistence that the education to which a disabled person is equally entitled should 
be provided in circumstances which cause disruption to the education of others’ (para. [238]).  
Justice Callinan was also concerned that the right to safety of others must be paramount.  
Emphasising the ‘quasi-criminal’ nature of Daniel Hoggan’s behaviour, he, like Chief Justice 
Gleeson, cast doubt on the constitutional validity of legislation which would compel States to 
ignore State criminal laws by excusing or allowing violent behaviour, even when caused by 
disability, to continue to pose a threat to others (paras. [266], [271]).  
 
Purvis and strategies for exclusion 
To support their dismissal of Daniel Hoggan’s claim of direct discrimination flowing from his 
exclusion, the majority judges developed controversial tests for proof of less favourable 
treatment and causation which allow the impact of disability related problem behaviour to be 
considered. There is little doubt that they were influenced in their reasoning by the absence in 
the DDA, as it then was drafted, of the availability of the unjustifiable hardship exemption post 
enrolment (Dickson, 2005; Edwards, 2004; Rattigan, 2004).  In earlier cases, such as L, K and 
P, the unjustifiable hardship exemption had been relied on to render prima facie direct 
discrimination lawful (Dickson, 2004).  
 
The majority judges were also, clearly, influenced by a perceived need to construe the Act to 
deliver an interpretation which allowed for ‘a proper intersection between the operation of the 
Act [DDA] and the operation of State and Federal criminal law’(para. [227] per Justices 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon.): 
Daniel's actions constituted assaults. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to decide 
whether he could or would have been held criminally responsible for them. It is enough 
to recognise that there will be cases where criminal conduct for which the perpetrator 
would be held criminally responsible could be seen to have occurred as a result of some 
disorder, illness or disease. It follows that there can be cases in which the perpetrator 
could be said to suffer a disability within the meaning of the Act (para. [227] per 
Justices Gummow, Hayne and Heydon).  
It would be a startling result if the Act, on its proper construction, did not permit an 
employer, educational authority, or other person subject to the Act to require, as a 
universal rule, that employees and pupils comply with the criminal law (para. [228] per 
Justices Gummow, Hayne and Heydon).  
 
Purvis and the ‘comparator’ 
Proof of direct discrimination requires a comparison between the treatment of the complainant 
with disability and the treatment of a ‘comparator’ person without the disability in order to 
determine whether the complainant has been treated ‘less favourably’ (DDA s. 5).  
Complainants and respondents have argued diametrically opposed interpretations of the 
‘identity’ of the notional comparator.  In the context of impairments which cause problem 
behaviours which impact on others, the question is not only poignant but crucial to the outcome 
of the case.  In Purvis, as well as in earlier cases such as L, P and K, the complainants argued 
that the appropriate comparator is a person without the impairment and without the impairment 
induced behaviour.  If the comparison is between the treatment of the person with the problem 
behaviour and the treatment of a person without it then it is obviously easier to prove ‘less 
favourable treatment’ because it could only rarely be proved that a person without the 
behaviour would have been disciplined or excluded in the same manner as the complainant.  
Respondents in those cases argued that the appropriate comparator is a person without the 
impairment but with the behaviour.  When the behaviour is common to complainant and 
comparator it is obviously easier to rebut any allegation of discrimination as it could only rarely 
be proved that the comparator would not have been disciplined or excluded in the same manner 
as the complainant.  The decision of the High Court in Purvis appears to have settled the answer 
to the comparator question: the appropriate comparator is a person without the complainant’s 
impairment but with the complainant’s behaviour, even though the complainant’s behaviour is 
a manifestation of and caused by disability. Because the ‘normal’ comparator who 
‘misbehaves’ would be sanctioned, it is appropriate that the complainant be sanctioned, and, as 
such, there is no less favourable treatment (para. [12] per Chief Justice Gleeson, per Justices 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon, para. [222]).   The majority approach in Purvis at the time was 
directly at odds with the view taken by the minority, by earlier benches of the High Court (see, 
for example, IW, p.33 per Justice Toohey, pp 40-1 per Justice Gummow, p.67 per Justice 
Kirby), and by assorted anti-discrimination tribunals (See, e.g., L, K and P).  Moreover, 
allowing the unwilled acts of the complainant to be compared with the willed violence of a 
person without disability must understandably be offensive to those with disabilities and their 
supporters.  The Purvis approach to the comparator issue remains the law, however, and, as 
discussed, below, has been readily applied in later cases involving disability related problem 
behaviour.   
 
Purvis and causation 
Discrimination must be causally related to a protected attribute before it will be unlawful.  The 
DDA prohibits, for example, discrimination ‘because of’ disability (ss. 5, 6). In Purvis, each 
of the judgments identified causation as an issue relevant to liability (paras. [12]-[13] per Chief 
Justice Gleeson, para. [166] per Justices McHugh and Kirby, para. [236] per Justices Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon, paras. [267]-[270] per Justice Callinan). Justices across the minority and 
the majority accepted that it was necessary to look at ‘why’ or the ‘real reason’ the relevant 
treatment had occurred. Even though there was significant agreement between the judges as to 
the relevant test, the minority and majority could reach different conclusions because of the 
different way they read ‘disability’.  The minority justices would not have authorised a 
separation of the behavioural manifestations from the underpinning disability, and exclusion 
because of Daniel’s behaviour, they found, was exclusion because of his disability. As with 
their treatment of the comparator issue, however, the majority justices could comfortably 
separate the behavioural manifestations of the disability for the purpose of working out the 
cause of the treatment. In their view, the legitimate answer to the question, ‘why was Daniel 
Hoggan expelled?’, would have been a ‘lawful’ reason: ‘because of his behaviour’.    
 The judgment of Chief Justice Gleeson exemplifies the majority conclusion: ‘The expressed 
and genuine basis of the principal's decision [to exclude Daniel] was the danger to other pupils 
and staff constituted by the pupil's violent conduct, and the principal's responsibilities towards 
those people’ (para. [13]). His Honour’s judgment, however, arguably goes further than any of 
the other judgments in Purvis in its potential to protect a school seeking to exclude a student 
with disability related problem behaviour. While his ‘true basis’ test for causation is 
superficially similar to that expounded by other members of the Court, upon closer reading 
Chief Justice Gleeson places much more emphasis on a subjective enquiry into the thought 
processes of the alleged discriminator and, particularly, into the express reasons for the 
treatment offered by the alleged discriminator.  It is true that the analyses offered by Justices 
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, McHugh and Kirby suggest that there is an element of subjectivity 
involved in the causation enquiry, to the extent, at least, that the reason for the treatment is a 
question of fact.  Chief Justice Gleeson, however, went further in his analysis implying that 
there is no room, on the particular facts of Purvis at least, for any objective analysis of the 
motivation of the alleged discriminator: ‘There is no reason for rejecting the principal's 
statement of the basis of his decision as being the violent conduct of the pupil, and his concern 
for the safety of other pupils and staff members’ (para. [14]). 
 
The judgment of Chief Justice Gleeson suggests that the explanation offered by the alleged 
discriminator is simply to be accepted as the reason for his actions.  Indeed, his Honour says 
that it would be ‘unfair’ to the principal of South Grafton State High School to find a 
discriminatory ‘basis’ for his decision: ‘It is not incompatible with the legislative scheme to 
identify the basis of the principal's decision as that which he expressed. On the contrary, to 
identify the pupil's disability as the basis of the decision would be unfair to the principal and 
to the first respondent [the State of New South Wales]’ (para. [14]).  While Chief Justice 
Gleeson concedes that from the point of view of Daniel Hoggan it may be reasonable to believe 
that he was expelled ‘because of’ his disability, his Honour stresses that, as it was the 
lawfulness of the principal’s actions that was in question, it was his point of view which was 
relevant to the enquiry (para. [13]). 
 
Allowing an exclusively subjective enquiry such as this into the reasons advanced by the 
alleged discriminator is potentially dangerous in that it encourages the unscrupulous invention 
of ‘authorised’ reasons for acting.  As such, Chief Justice Gleeson’sreading of causation would 
inevitably mean less pressure on institutions and individuals to accommodate people with 
disabilities.  The unscrupulous school administration, for example, could escape liability 
simply by asserting that it was a student’s ‘truancy’, not his or her impairment, that was the 
‘basis’ of a decision to exclude (See, e.g., BI for a case concerning disability related non-
attendance).  Upon the analysis of Chief Justice Gleeson there is no need to evaluate, 
objectively, the reasons advanced for the ‘truancy’, no need, even, to enquire whether the 
‘truancy’ was an incidence of the student’s impairment.  Further, the unscrupulous school could 
be encouraged to manufacture a misleading document trail which supported the stated reason 
for exclusion.   
 
 
 
Purvis applied 
Later courts and tribunals considering disability discrimination in education cases were quick 
to adopt the majority approach in Purvis to both the comparator issue and causation.  In Tyler, 
a 2006 DDA case, Federal Magistrate Driver , of the then Federal Magistrates Court (since 
2014, the Federal Circuit Court), found that the temporary exclusion of a student with Down’s 
syndrome, who had, allegedly, thrown an object from a balcony which hit a teacher, was not 
discriminatory.  There were problems with proof of a link between the disability of the 
complainant and his behaviour with Federal Magistrate Driver noting that, ‘while there is 
clearly evidence that Joseph presented with behavioural difficulties, I have no medical evidence 
at all that these were a consequence of his Down’s syndrome’ (para. [105]).  Nevertheless, the 
decision arguably extends the scope of Purvis beyond the context of students proved to be 
violent to apply to students who simply stand accused of being violent.  Although Federal 
Magistrate Driver refused to find that the complainant had thrown the object or even that he 
was ‘involved’ in the throwing incident (para. [105]), he found that a comparator without the 
complainant’s disability but similarly standing accused of throwing would also have been 
temporarily excluded (para. [107]).  The ‘subjective’ approach of Chief Justice Gleeson to 
causation was also influential in this case.  Federal Magistrate Driver simply accepted the 
reason advanced by the principal of the school as the operative reason for the suspension: 
…it is clear from the evidence of Rabbi Spielman [the principal], which I accept, that 
he took his action not because of any concern about a behavioural consequence of 
Joseph’s disability, but rather because of his concern about the College’s duty of care 
to its teachers and its students (including Joseph). Rabbi Spielman was seriously 
concerned, after the alleged throwing incident, that the College might breach its duty 
of care if it did not take immediate action (para. [105]). 
 
His honour, like the majority of the High Court, was impressed by duty of care issues and found 
that ‘[i]t would have been irresponsible for Rabbi Spielman [the principal] to have taken no 
action as that would have exposed the College to substantial risk’ (para. [105]).  
 
The majority approach in Purvis was also quickly applied in an education case beyond the 
context of the DDA.  In 2004, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal relied on it to 
defeat a claim of discrimination made under the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) by a student 
with problem behaviour linked to his disabilities.  In Zygorodimos the plaintiff student had 
been shifted to a different class in response to his behaviour problems and the stress they caused 
his teacher.  He had not exhibited ‘violence’ of the kind complained of in Purvis but had 
nevertheless been ‘difficult’ (para. [49]).  He had, among other misdemeanours, thrown 
tantrums, been inattentive, put ‘inappropriate objects’ in his mouth, and run from the 
classroom.  This case demonstrates not only a willingness to apply the majority approach in a 
less ‘dangerous’ context than that postulated in Purvis, but also in the context of state 
legislation where the availability of other exemptions (In Zygorodimos, relevantly, Equal 
Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 39, special services or facilities exception) would have already, 
perhaps, allowed an ‘out’ to a court keen to authorize the apparently ‘less favourable’ treatment 
of a ‘problem’ complainant.  It is of further interest that the Tribunal refused to consider 
evidence of other ‘circumstances’ asserted by the complainant to be relevant to his treatment.  
This evidence may have brought into issue the appropriateness of the school’s response to the 
complainant’s behaviour:  
Before leaving this claim I should add that Mr Gray, counsel for Ben, relied on various 
matters which he said I should take into account to formulate the proper comparator. 
These included provisions concerning disciplinary policies of state schools in the 
Education Regulations 2000, the absence of a provision for the transfer of a child from 
one class to another in VCD's code of student conduct, and views expressed by some 
of the witnesses, such as the education expert Professor Branson, about when it would 
be appropriate to transfer a child for behavioural reasons from one class to another. 
While this evidence may be appropriate in general terms in dealing with the challenging 
behaviour of children, the only evidence which, in my view, is relevant to the proper 
comparator here, is how Dr Pearce would have treated a child other than Ben without 
epilepsy, but with similar behaviour [para. [100]). 
 
 
Law reform after Purvis 
The DDA was amended, after and in response to Purvis, in 2009, to make it plain that a 
disability included its manifestations (DDA s. 4) (See Disability Discrimination and Other 
Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth)). This amendment, however, delivers 
little practical benefit in respect of the application of the DDA because of the way the 
comparator and causation tests were settled in Purvis. While the problematic manifestations of 
the disability are allowed to be separated from the underlying disability, direct discrimination 
will remain difficult, if not impossible, to prove. In the same suite of amendments, the 
unjustifiable hardship exemption was made available post-enrolment.  While this amendment 
was too late to counter the impact of the High Court’s construction of the comparator and 
causation tests in Purvis, its impact on proof of unlawful discrimination is addressed, below.  
The 2009 amendments also imposed an express obligation to make reasonable adjustment 
(DDA ss. 5 and 6) in response to the finding of the High Court in Purvis that an implied 
obligation could not be drawn from the text of the DDA (See Disability Discrimination and 
Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth) ss 13-17). That obligation, in the 
education context, is now enshrined in the DSE which were implemented in 2005 and which 
are also considered below.  
 
Indirect discrimination 
Indirect discrimination (DDA s. 6) potentially occurs if a condition, often implied but 
sometimes express, is imposed on a group. It may be discriminatory if a person with disability 
is unable to ‘comply’ with that condition, and the effect is that the condition causes 
disadvantage to him or her. It will be discriminatory, if the condition is then not proven to be 
reasonable. It was suggested by Chief Justice Gleeson in Purvis that Daniel Hoggan’s case was 
not framed as one of indirect discrimination in order to avoid the reasonableness enquiry (para. 
[3]).  It is instructive to compare how the reasonableness issue has been dealt with in cases 
similar to that of Daniel Hoggan, but formulated as indirect discrimination claims.  The New 
South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSWADT) case of M&C, and the DDA case, 
Minns, both involved allegations of indirect discrimination against students with Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).   
 
Both M, of M&C, and Ryan Minns were frequently disciplined for breaches of the school rules. 
In Minns, Federal Magistrate Raphael explicitly drew attention to the similarities between that 
case and the Purvis case commenting that the consequence of Daniel Hoggan’s disability was 
‘violent and anti-social behaviour very similar to that exhibited by Ryan Minns’ (para. [191]).  
 
Both the NSWADT and Federal Magistrate Raphael  emphasised that it was reasonable that 
schools have and enforce codes of conduct.  Indeed, the NSWADT found the point so ‘trite’ 
that it required ‘no further discussion’ (para. [123]).  Federal Magistrate Raphael determined 
that such codes were necessary to enable ‘all students to benefit from the educational 
opportunities offered and the requirement to allow this to happen in a safe environment’ (para. 
[247]).   
 
The issue in both cases, however, was not the reasonableness of the code, per se, but the 
reasonableness of the required compliance with the code imposed on the complainants who 
alleged that their impairment prevented such compliance.  The evidence of M’s mother, in 
M&C, was that M ‘simply was not capable of controlling her behaviour’ (para. [117]). The 
complainant’s case in Minns, disputed by the respondent, was that Ryan’s impairment made it 
‘impossible for him to behave in a manner compliant with the discipline policy’ (para. [250]).  
 
The NSWADT found against M on a technical issue and her case failed (See Dickson (2004) 
for further detail).  The Tribunal was nevertheless critical of the inflexible administration of 
discipline policy at both schools which M attended.  Whilst there was considerable discretion 
as to which penalty was meted out, there was no discretion to give no penalty at all.  The 
Tribunal characterised the slavish adherence to the discipline policy as ‘unreasonable’: 
While such behaviour [physical aggression] is clearly unacceptable, and it is reasonable 
to require that such children [children with ADHD] respect others and their property, it 
seems to us that it is unreasonable to apply a disciplinary regime in blanket fashion to 
all children regardless of their subjective features (para. [131]).   
 
The Tribunal compared the inflexible application of the discipline code with a mandatory 
sentencing regime, ‘a form of punishment and social control, which has been shown to be 
largely ineffective in modifying the conduct of people with significant psychiatric or 
psychological difficulties’ (para. [135]). 
  
The Tribunal also emphasised that it was not reasonable to expect a child such as M to comply 
with the policy unless she had ‘special support to enable…her to do so’ (para. [131]). The facts, 
here, were that M did not have this ‘special support’.  Thus, the Tribunal found a clear causal 
link between the lack of support and M’s failure to comply with the discipline code: 
Not only was M an ADD sufferer, she was well behind her colleagues academically…In 
those circumstances, it was unreasonable to expect that she could significantly modify 
her behaviour as a result of being frequently disciplined in the absence of that attention, 
support and special care.  It was in our view therefore unreasonable to punish her in the 
same fashion as any other member of the student body if she failed to comply with the 
requirements of the Code (para. [133]).  
 
The Tribunal’s reasoning here is similar to the reasoning of Commissioner Innes at first 
instance in the HREOC hearing of the Purvis case. Commissioner Innes found that the South 
Grafton High School had not taken reasonable steps to accommodate Daniel Hoggan’s 
impairment and that this failure had contributed to his behaviour problems. Ultimately this 
analysis of the evidence was rejected by the majority in Purvis.  The cynical view, however, is 
that the Tribunal only made its pointed criticism of the respondent because having already 
found against M, it could safely admonish the respondent without actually having to enforce, 
controversially, any improvement in the respondent’s treatment of its students. 
 
The facts of the Minns case differed from the facts of M&C in that there was not the same 
weight of evidence of lack of specialist support for Ryan.  In addition, there was evidence that 
the school had administered the discipline policy flexibly to accommodate Ryan’s impairment.  
It should also be noted that Ryan and his mother objected to Ryan’s taking prescribed 
medication which may have modified his behaviour.  Nevertheless, the complainant argued, 
along the lines of M&C that the respondent had failed to take reasonable steps to deal with 
Ryan.  The complainant suggested alternative methods of management of Ryan’s behaviour.  
The Court was not convinced, however, that this line of argument was relevant (para. [256]) 
and found that the complainant had not proved that the requirement that Ryan comply with the 
code was ‘not reasonable’: 
I am of the view that the requirement that was placed upon Ryan to comply with each 
of the school's disciplinary policies as modified was reasonable in all the circumstances. 
The classes in which Ryan was placed would be unable to function if he could not be 
removed for disruptive behaviour.  The students could not achieve their potential if 
most of the teachers’ time was taken up with handling Ryan.  The playgrounds would 
not be safe if Ryan was allowed free rein for his aggressive actions.  Therefore the claim 
for indirect discrimination must fail in the manner in which it is put’ (para. [263]).  
 
Thus, in determining the reasonableness issue against Ryan Minns, Federal Magistrate Raphael 
balanced the benefit to Ryan in allowing him ‘free rein’ against the potential detriment to others 
in the school community and Ryan’s interests yielded to the interests of the majority.  His 
language is clearly reminiscent of the language of Chief Justice Gleeson (paras. [11]-[14]) and 
Justice Callinan (para. [266]) in the High Court in Purvis who were so concerned about the 
detriment to others in the South Grafton State High School community should Daniel Hoggan’s 
enrolment be maintained.  There seems little doubt that, had the Purvis claim been framed as 
one of indirect discrimination, alleging that Daniel could not comply with a condition that he 
comply with the school’s discipline code, it would have stumbled upon proof that the condition 
was not reasonable.  
 
The Unjustifiable Hardship Exemption 
Proof that avoiding discrimination of a student with disability related problem behaviour would 
cause unjustifiable hardship to the discriminator will render a prima facie case of discrimination 
lawful (see, e.g. DDA s 29A). In the DDA, pursuant to s. 11, the hardship enquiry will consider 
the ‘effect’ of the disability, and the impact of inclusion for ‘any person concerned’, balancing 
the ‘benefit’ that flows from inclusion against the ‘detriment’ – the education and social 
benefits for all students, for example, of an inclusive school against the risk of danger or 
disruption that the inclusion causes. The cost of avoiding the discrimination and the financial 
resources of the discriminator – the education institution – are also relevant.   
 
As noted above, when Daniel Hoggan was excluded from his mainstream school, the 
unjustifiable hardship exemption was not available to schools after the point of enrolment.  As 
such, there was no sign-posted legislative method of authorising Daniel’s exclusion.  When the 
comparator question had arisen in the context of other anti-discrimination legislation, most 
notably in the ADAQ cases, L, P and K, tribunals could allow a reading which accorded respect 
to prevailing disability theory, and, arguably, to the object of the anti-discrimination legislation 
of protecting against ‘unfair’ discrimination (See, e.g., DDA s 3, ADAQ long title), because 
they could rely on the unjustifiable hardship exemption to legitimise the removal of the 
problem student. In the ADAQ cases there was no pressure on the QADT to separate behaviour 
from impairment for the purpose of making a comparison, as a more direct route to finding no 
compensable discrimination was available.  The QADT could accommodate the arguments of 
both complainant and respondent in that they could find both that discrimination had occurred 
and that it was not unlawful.  The Queensland legislation, as interpreted by the QADT, allowed 
the Tribunal to make at least a ‘show’ of understanding the discrimination suffered by the 
complainant.  While it must be conceded that it is doubtful that this ‘show’ delivered any more 
comfort to the complainants in L, K and P, than the outright denial of discrimination delivered 
by the High Court to Daniel Hoggan, it can be concluded that the ADAQ, as interpreted by the 
QADT, allowed, then, a more honest weighing of competing considerations than the DDA as 
manipulated by the majority in Purvis, while still balancing minority and majority rights and 
delivering a ‘fair’ decision.  
 
Unjustifiable hardship and ‘cost’ 
It can be argued that if enough support – support which may well be expensive – were made 
available many more students could be placed in mainstream schools.  In the Purvis case, for 
example, the minority justices found that more could have been done to support the inclusion 
of Daniel Hoggan (paras. [106]-[107]). In cases such as L (p. 17) and P (p. 787) it was also 
clear from the facts that more teacher aide and specialist teacher support would have reduced 
both the stress to staff and the disruption to the learning environment which accompanied the 
inclusion of the complainants.   
 
The link between the spending of money on resources, on the one hand, and the avoidance of 
threats to safety and of disruption of the learning environment, on the other, was made plain, 
however, in the case of K.  In that case the Tribunal conceded that K ‘could be properly 
educated in a regular classroom setting’ (p. 623) but that the provision of resources by the 
school needed to facilitate her inclusion at the respondent independent school would have 
caused unjustifiable financial hardship (p. 623).  More recent cases have indicated that the cost 
of supporting a student with disability, and particularly of the one-on-one support that may 
mitigate the impact of problem behaviour on other students and on staff, may amount to 
unjustifiable hardship even for state run schools. In Sievwright, for example, Justice Marshall 
cited Chief Justice Gleeson in Purvis (para. [7]) in making the point that, ‘[t]he obligations of 
the State in respect of individual children must be considered alongside the wider legal 
responsibilities which teachers and administrators owe to all students’ (para. [207]). Allocation 
of one on one support to students such as Sievwright would have required a doubling of the 
disability support budget for the state of Victoria and, by implication, directed already scarce 
resources away from other priorities (para. [109]).   
 
Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) 
The High Court in Purvis, both minority and majority justices, rejected the complainant’s 
contention that the DDA imposed upon institutions such as schools an implied duty to make 
‘reasonable accommodation’ for people with disabilities.  Before Purvis, it had been generally 
accepted that there was such a duty (see Dickson, 2006). The minority justices found on the 
facts that the school had failed to do enough to support Daniel and that as a result he was treated 
less favourably.  The majority justices, of course, focussed on Daniel’s behaviour rather than 
on the way the school supported, or failed to support him.  
When the DSE came into force in 2005, they fixed the ‘problem’ of the missing obligation 
under the DDA to the extent that they do impose on education institutions an obligation to 
make ‘reasonable adjustment’ for students with disability across a range of aspects of school 
life: enrolment, participation, curriculum and student support. As noted, above, the DDA was 
then amended in 2009 to impose an obligation to make reasonable adjustment across a range 
of protected areas, including education.  This was done both to remove any doubt about the 
legality of the obligation in the DSE, absent authority in the DDA (see DSE s 1.6; Dickson, 
2014), and to shift the burden of compliance with the DDA away from a complaints based 
mechanism driven by disaffected students, towards a positive institutional obligation to take 
action to remove discriminatory policies and practices (Dickson, 2006).  
A clear benefit of the DSE for all students with disability is that they mandate consultation with 
the student and, where appropriate, the student’s parents or guardians, about the support they 
see as necessary to effect inclusion at a mainstream school. Consultation must occur at the 
point of enrolment (s. 4.2(3)), and during enrolment at a school (ss. 5.2(3), 6.2(3), 7.2(7). To 
discharge its obligations under the DDA, a school must consider what adjustments may be 
necessary to support a student’s enrolment as an integral part of working out whether those 
adjustments are reasonable.  Rejecting an enrolment without first considering reasonable 
adjustment exposes a school to allegations both of breach of the DSE (DDA s. 32) and of direct 
discrimination under the DDA (s. 5).   
There are immediately apparent problems with the DSE, however, as they apply to students 
with disability related problem behaviour.  First, it is implicit in the obligation to make 
reasonable adjustments, that ‘unreasonable’ adjustments will not be required. adjustments are 
obliged only if ‘reasonable’. The same sorts of matters as are relevant here as to proof of 
reasonableness in respect of indirect discrimination. Further, the unjustifiable hardship 
exemption will excuse a school from making even a reasonable adjustment (DSE s.10). The 
same sorts of considerations relevant to proof of unjustifiable hardship in the DDA will apply 
in respect of the subordinate DSE as the DSE imports the definition of unjustifiable hardship 
from the DDA (s.10 note). This scheme sets up a very thick set of limits on any adjustments 
which may support inclusion (Dickson, 2014). The effect of including a disruptive or dangerous 
student on others in the school community and the cost of supporting his or her enrolment will 
be relevant to both reasonableness (s. 3.4(2)) and hardship (DDA s 11). The capacity to pay for 
expensive adjustments is relevant to hardship (DDA s 11).  
Two of the few Federal Court cases to date which have interpreted and applied the DSE, Walker 
and Abela, concerned students with problem behaviour. In both cases, a Purvis style analysis 
of proof of less favourable treatment and causation was applied: there was no less favourable 
treatment of the complainant because a student without his disability, but with his problem 
behaviour would also have been excluded; there was no causal link between the disability and 
the treatment because its ‘true basis’ was concerns about safety concern not the student’s 
disability.   Further, in both cases there was no reasonable adjustment identified which may 
have mitigated the behaviour and contained its impact on the school community and which had 
not been made available.  Since the DSE were introduced, it may be incumbent upon education 
providers to demonstrate attempts to accommodate problem behaviour via adjustments such as 
individual aide support and withdrawal from settings which may stimulate or aggravate the 
problem behaviour.  However, the facts of Walker and Abela suggest that there may be 
situations where adjustments cannot remove, or even reduce to an acceptable level, the risk of 
harm posed by the enrolment of the student with the disability related problem behaviour.   
 
Conclusion 
It is clear from the decided cases that many students with behavioural and intellectual 
impairments are guaranteed fewer educational opportunities than students with other 
impairments or without impairments. These students have fewer opportunities principally 
because their inclusion in the mainstream class room is perceived to interfere with majority 
rights.  Some commentators have suggested that the problem is community ‘intolerance’ rather 
than individual ‘interference’ and that all that is required to effect full inclusion of students 
with impairments is a change of ‘attitude’ on the part of staff and students (Christensen, 1996; 
Slee, 2008).  The courts, however, have been concerned by what they regard as tangible threats 
to community safety and to the viability of the learning environment posed by students who 
cannot, because of impairment, conform to school rules and standards of behaviour.   
 
It is to be hoped, however, that the regime of limitations acknowledged and constructed by 
Australian courts and tribunals does not permit education institutions in Australia to avoid 
making adjustments that would allow schools to operate more inclusively.  While 
uncontrollable violence cannot be neutralised, that situation should be distinguished from the 
situation where a student reacts ‘violently’ to an inflexible and unsympathetic environment.  
Anti-discrimination legislation, such as the DDA, aims to eliminate discrimination ‘as far as 
possible’ (DDA s. 3) acknowledging that sometimes discrimination will be lawful where it is 
fair to allow it.  Care must be taken, however, that discrimination which is not ‘fair’, but which 
is simply ‘convenient’ or ‘expedient’ or ‘cost effective’, is not allowed to flourish under an 
inflexible and unsympathetic regime which accords more respect to the letter of the law than 
to the interests of people with impairments. 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 It is acknowledged that ‘inclusion’ is a contested term in the context of the education of 
students with disability. Analysis of the meaning of the term is beyond the scope of this chapter.  
For the purpose of this chapter, ‘inclusion’ is used by the author to mean full time enrolment 
at a mainstream school which also enrols students without disability. 
 
2 Cases are referred to by their abbreviated names throughout this chapter. For the full citation 
of the case “P”, and the full citations other cases referred to by their abbreviated names in the 
chapter, please see the case list at the end of the chapter.  
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